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Understanding the inferential principles un-
derpinning an argument is essential to the
proper interpretation and evaluation of persua-
sive discourse. Argument schemes capture the
conventional patterns of reasoning appealed to
in persuasion. The empirical study of these
patterns relies on the availability of data about
the actual use of argumentation in commu-
nicative practice. Annotated corpora of argu-
ment schemes, however, are scarce, small, and
unrepresentative. Aiming to address this is-
sue, we present one step in the development
of improved datasets by integrating the Argu-
ment Scheme Key – a novel annotation method
based on one of the most popular typologies of
argument schemes – into the widely used OVA
software for argument analysis.
1 Introduction
In argumentative discourse, a speaker or writer in-
tends to convince their audience of a contested
point of view (van Eemeren et al., 2014). To con-
vince their audience, an appeal is made to reason-
ing, either in direct conversation (such as a court-
room discussion), or in indirect or monological
settings (such as a political speech). The argumen-
tative quality of such discourse can be evaluated
from various perspectives. In the current paper, we
focus on the argumentative quality in terms of the
acceptability of the reasoning appealed to in the
arguments – thus disregarding, e.g., the rhetorical
effectiveness, another dimension of the quality of
argumentative discourse.
Consider Hillary Clinton’s argument in Exam-
ple (1) – taken from the US2016 annotated corpus
of television debates in the lead-up to the 2016 US
presidential elections (Visser et al., 2019a). An-
ticipating that her first asserted proposition might
not be outright acceptable to the entire audience,
she provides a reason in support. By defending
her policy proposal by comparing the dangers of
potential terrorists flying to the dangers of them
buying guns, Clinton’s argument relies on a con-
ventionalised reasoning pattern: that comparable
situations should be dealt with similarly.
(1) Hillary Clinton: And we finally need to
pass a prohibition on anyone who’s on the
terrorist watch list from being able to buy
a gun in our country. If you’re too danger-
ous to fly, you are too dangerous to buy a
gun.
Evaluating an argument begins by identifying the
reasoning pattern it is based on. These com-
mon reasoning patterns are conceptualised within
the field of argumentation theory as ‘argument
schemes’ (Section 2). While corpus-linguistic ap-
proaches have gained traction in the study of argu-
mentation – partly motivated by the rise of ‘argu-
ment mining’ (Stede and Schneider, 2018) – these
have generally focused on aspects of argumenta-
tive discourse other than argument schemes (such
as the use of rhetorical figures of speech (Har-
ris and Di Marco, 2017)). The empirical study
of argument schemes would greatly benefit from
quantitative data in the form of annotated text cor-
pora. Existing corpora annotated with argument
schemes, however, tend to be based on restricted
typologies, be of limited size, or suffer from poor
validation (Section 3).
In the current paper, we aim to support the an-
notation of argument schemes by combining a re-
cently developed annotation method for one of
the leading typologies of argument schemes (Sec-
tion 4) and a popular online software tool for
annotating argumentative discourse, OVA (Sec-
tion 5). The standard version of OVA, and other
software for manual argument annotation, such
as Araucaria (Reed and Rowe, 2004), Rationale
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Figure 1: OVA visualisation of the practical reasoning from analogy scheme in Example (1).
(van Gelder, 2007), and Carneades (Gordon et al.,
2007) allow the analyst to label arguments with a
particular scheme, but they do not offer support to
the analyst in the actual scheme selection, which
is what our OVA extension is aimed at.
2 Argument Schemes
Argument schemes are theoretical abstractions of
the conventional patterns of reasoning appealed to
in persuasive communication, substantiating the
inferential relation between premise(s) and con-
clusion. The defeasibility of the schemes sets
them apart from the strict reasoning patterns of
classical formal logic (e.g., Modus Ponens). The
type of argument scheme determines its evaluation
criteria, commonly expressed as critical questions
– owing to the dialectical origins of the notion (van
Eemeren and Garssen, 2019). Adequately arguing
for a standpoint implies both that the premise(s)
of the argument should be acceptable, and that the
argumentative connection between the premise(s)
and the conclusion can withstand the critical ques-
tioning.
Since their introduction (Hastings, 1963; Perel-
man and Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969; van Eemeren
et al., 1978), argument schemes have become a
central topic in argumentation studies, leading to
a variety of typologies, e.g., by Schellens (1985),
Kienpointner (1992), van Eemeren and Grooten-
dorst (1992), and Walton (1996). The latter has
found particular uptake in computation-oriented
approaches (Rahwan and Simari, 2009; Baroni
et al., 2018), and is the starting point for the an-
notation tool we currently present.
Walton’s typology comprises a great variety of
schemes, conventionally occurring in argumenta-
tive practices ranging from colloquial discussion
to legal adjudication (Walton et al., 2008). Many
of the schemes are commonly distinguished in di-
alectical or informal-logical approaches to argu-
mentation (e.g. argument from sign and argument
from cause to effect). Others, however, are more
exotic or highly specialised (e.g. argument from
arbitrariness of a verbal classification), are closer
to modes of persuasion in a rhetorical perspec-
tive on argumentation (e.g. ethotic argument), or
would in other approaches be considered fallacies
(e.g. generic ad hominem). The list also includes
composite schemes that combine aspects from var-
ious schemes into one (e.g. practical reasoning
from analogy combining practical reasoning and
argument from analogy).
3 Annotating Argument Schemes
The annotation of argument schemes comprises
the classification of the inferential relations be-
tween premises and conclusions of arguments in
accordance with a particular typology. Figure 1
shows a diagrammatic visualisation of the ar-
gument of Example (1) with in the middle the
classification of the argument scheme as an in-
stance of practical reasoning from analogy. While
we start from Walton’s typology, alternative ap-
proaches are also employed for scheme identifica-
tion: Green (2015) presents ten custom argument
schemes for genetics research articles, Musi et al.
(2016) explore annotation guidelines on the basis
of the Argumentum Model of Topics (Rigotti and
Greco, 2019), and Visser et al. (2019b) annotate
argument schemes on the basis of the Periodic Ta-
ble of Arguments (Wagemans, 2016).
Existing annotations on the basis of Walton’s
typology tend to use a restricted set of scheme
types, and struggle to obtain replicable results.
For example, Duschl (2007) initially adopts a se-
lection of nine argument schemes described by
Walton (1996), for his annotation of transcribed
middle-school student interviews about science
fair projects. Later, however, he collapses sev-
eral schemes into four more general classes no
longer directly related to particular scheme types.
This deviation from Walton’s typology appears
to be motivated by the need to improve annota-
tion agreement. The validation of the annotation
method does not account for chance agreement, by
only providing percentage-agreement scores (in-
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Figure 2: A binary taxonomic tree representation of the ASK
stead of resorting to, e.g., a κ or α metric. Out of
a total of 17 texts, the inter-annotator agreement
is reported on two as 90% and 84%. No detail is
provided on the sampling method.
Similarly, Song et al. (2014) base their annota-
tion on a modification of Walton’s typology, set-
tling on a restricted set of three more general
schemes: policy, causal, and sample – resulting
in Cohen’s κ scores for inter-annotator agreement
ranging from 0.364 to 0.848. Anthony and Kim
(2015) employ a bespoke set of nine coding la-
bels modified from the categories used by Duschl
(2007) and nine schemes described in a textbook
by Walton (2006). They do not measure any inter-
annotator agreement, opting for a fully open col-
laborative annotation without any testing of the re-
liability of the methods.
4 The Argument Scheme Key (ASK)
Visser et al. (2018) aim to develop an annota-
tion procedure that stays close to Walton’s orig-
inal typology, while facilitating the reliable an-
notation of a broad range of argument schemes.
The resulting method is reported to yield an inter-
annotator agreement of 0.723 (in terms of Cohen’s
(1960) κ) on a 10.2% random sample. The main
principle guiding the annotation is the clustering
of argument schemes on the basis of intuitively
clear features recognisable for annotators. Due to
the strong reliance on the distinctive properties of
arguments that are characteristic for a particular
scheme, the annotation procedure bears a striking
resemblance to methods for biological taxonomy –
the identification of organisms in the various sub-
fields of biology (see, e.g., Voss (1952); Pankhurst
(1978)). Drawing on the biological analogue and
building on the guidelines used by Visser et al.
(2018), we developed a taxonomic key for the
identification of argument schemes in accordance
with Walton’s typology: the Argument Scheme
Key – or ASK.
The ASK (reproduced in Appendix A) is a di-
chotomous identification key that leads the ana-
lyst through a series of disjunctive choices based
on the distinctive features of a ‘species’ of argu-
ment scheme to the particular type. Starting from
the distinction between source-based and other ar-
guments, each further choice in the key leads to
either a particular argument scheme or to a fur-
ther distinction. The distinctive characteristics are
numbered, listing between brackets the number of
any not directly preceding previous characteristic
that led to this particular point in the key.
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In annotating Example (1), an analyst using the
ASK follows a sequence of numbered character-
istics to identify the argument as an instance of
practical reasoning from analogy: 1. Argument
does not depend on a source’s opinion or charac-
ter; 17(1). Conclusion is about a course of action;
18. Argument hinges on another motivation for the
action [other than its outcome]; 19. Course of ac-
tion is compared to a similar or alternative action;
21(19). Action is directly compared to another.
The ASK dichotomous identification key can be
thought of as a linear textual rendering of a bi-
nary taxonomic tree. Figure 2 visualises the de-
cision procedure as such a tree, with each leaf rep-
resenting an argument scheme label, and all inter-
nal nodes showing clusters of schemes that share
particular characteristic properties. For each of the
numbered binary decision points in the ASK, the
tree representation branches into two, thus leading
the annotator from the full set of schemes, through
their binary choices, to one (and only one) leaf –
i.e. an argument scheme classification.
5 The ASK Assistant in the OVA Tool for
Argument Annotation
The Online Visualisation of Argument (OVA) tool
(Janier et al., 2014) is a web browser based appli-
cation (http://ova.arg.tech) used by over
3,000 individuals in 38 countries, to analyse and
annotate the argumentative structure of natural
language text, in contexts ranging from online dis-
cussions (Lawrence et al., 2017) to election de-
bates (Visser et al., 2019a). OVA builds on the
Argument Interchange Format (AIF) (Chesn˜evar
et al., 2006), an ontology for representing argu-
ment analyses compliant with Sematic Web and
Linked Data standards, and available in a vari-
ety of ‘reifications’ in languages including JSON,
RDF, and Prolog. The software offers import and
export of AIF resources from AIFdb (Lawrence
et al., 2012), the largest openly available collection
of analysed argument, containing over 1.8m words
and 170,000 claims in more than 15,000 AIF argu-
ment maps.
AIF analyses are graphs comprising nodes of
information (I-nodes), and instances of schemes
(S-nodes); with sub-types of S-nodes representing
the application of rules of inference (RA-nodes),
and rules of conflict (CA-nodes). An analysis in
OVA begins with segmentation by selecting spans
of text corresponding to propositions or Argumen-
tative Discourse Units (Peldszus and Stede, 2013),
and adding these to the canvas as I-nodes. Pairs
of I-nodes can then be connected, through RA- or
CA-nodes to form structures like that of Figure 1.
Complex argumentation structures (Groarke et al.,
1997; Snoeck Henkemans, 1992) can, in turn, be
formed by connecting an I-node to an existing S-
node, or by chaining the connections.
Whilst the original version of OVA allows for a
user to label any RA-node as an instance of an ar-
gument scheme from Walton’s typology by select-
ing from a dropdown list, in this work, we have in-
troduced the option for users to be guided through
this process using the ASK. In order to achieve
this, the ASK is first converted into JSON , a frag-
ment of which is shown in Listing 1 (we have also
made the full JSON representation available on-
line1 for download and integration into other ar-
gumentation tools). Each branching point in the
ASK has two options, which are represented by
their text, and a result – where the result can either
be a scheme name (“resulttype”: “scheme”) or a
pointer to another branching point (“resulttype”:
“branch”).




"text": "Argument relies on











When a user elects to use the ASK to help them se-
lect an argument scheme, they are presented with
a series of modal dialogue boxes similar to that
shown in Figure 3. At each stage, the user selects
one of the options and is then either presented with
the next dialogue box, or they reach a scheme clas-
sification which they can choose to accept and ap-
ply. An ordered list of user selections at each stage
is recorded so that they can step back through the
options if they wish to correct an earlier choice.
1http://arg.tech/˜john/waltonkey.json
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Figure 3: Using the ASK in OVA to annotate the argument scheme used by Clinton in Example (1)
6 Conclusion
Identifying the scheme an argument is based on
is an important part of evaluating the argumen-
tative quality of discourse. The availability of
large, reliable, and representative datasets is es-
sential both to the empirical study of the use of
argument schemes in argumentative practice, and
to the development of automated classifiers and
argument mining techniques. Existing annotated
corpora, however, such as those used by Feng and
Hirst (2011), and Lawrence and Reed (2015), for
the automatic classification of argument schemes,
are not validated, of limited size, or do not repre-
sent a broad range of scheme types.
Aiming to improve the availability of high-
quality argument scheme corpora, the online anno-
tation assistant we present here combines a novel
annotation method for Walton’s typology, with the
widely used OVA software for argument analy-
sis. The Argument Scheme Key (ASK) mod-
ule is available for annotators in OVA at http:
//ova.arg.tech. This work constitutes an in-
termediate step in the development of automated
classifiers, utilising the uniquely identifying char-
acteristics of the ASK. Future work will explore
the accuracy and robustness of manual annota-
tions by experts, non-experts, and crowd-sourcing
(Musi et al., 2016) using the ASK module in OVA.
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A ASK: Argument Scheme Key
1. Argument relies on a source’s opinion or character
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.
− Argument does not depend on a source’s opinion or
character . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17.
2. Argument is about the source’s character . . . . . . . 3.
− Argument is about the source’s opinion . . . . . . . 9.
3. Argument establishes the source’s character . . . . . . .
. . . . Argumentation from interaction of act and person
− Argument refers to the source’s existing character
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.
4. Argument relies on the source’s good character . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ethotic argument
− Argument relies on bad character . . . . . . . . . . . 5.
5. Source is biased . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.
− Argument is not related to bias . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.
6. Source does not take both sides into account . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Argument from bias
− Source’s opinion is not acceptable . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Bias ad hominem
7 (5). Source is of bad overall character . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Generic ad hominem
− The source’s actions are not compatible with their com-
mitments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.
8. Source’s actions contradict the advocated position . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Pragmatic inconsistency
− Source is not credible due to inconsistent commitments
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Circumstantial ad hominem
9 (2). Argument establishes a source’s opinion . . . . 10.
− Argument is based on an existing opinion . . . . . 11.
10. Commitment at issue is consistent with existing com-
mitments . . . . . . . . . . . Argument from commitment
− Commitment at issue is not consistent with existing
commitments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . Argument from inconsistent commitment
11 (9). Source is a general group of people . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Argument from popular opinion
− Source is a specific individual . . . . . . . . . . . . 12.
12. Source is an expert in the subject domain . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Argument from expert opinion
− Source’s credibility is not based on domain knowledge
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13.
13. Source is a witness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . Argument from witness testimony
− Source is not a witness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14.
14. Argument is based on the source’s memories . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Argument from memory
− Argument does not explicitly refer to memories . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15.
15. Argument is based on the source’s visual perception
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Argument from perception
− Argument does not explicitly refer to perception . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16.
16. Conclusion is about a course of action . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Two-person practical reasoning
− Argument is not action-oriented . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Argument from position to know
17 (1). Conclusion is about a course of action . . . . . 18.
− Conclusion is not specifically action-oriented . . . 32.
18. Argument focuses on the outcome of an action . . . 22.
− Argument hinges on another motivation for the action
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19.
19. Course of action follows an established practice . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20.
− Course of action is compared to a similar or alternative
action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21.
20. Course of action is explicitly regulated . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Argument from rules
− Course of action follows general practices . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Argument from popular practice
21 (19). Action is best alternative on the basis of prior com-
mitments . . . . . . . . . . . . Argument from sunk costs
− Action is directly compared to another . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . Practical reasoning from analogy
22 (18). Conclusion promotes a positive outcome . . . 23.
− Conclusion prevents a negative outcome . . . . . . 26.
23. Course of action assists someone else . . . . . . . . 24.
− Course of action does not offer help . . . . . . . . 25.
24. Course of action relieves suffering . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Argument from distress
− Argument does not mention suffering . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Argument from need for help
25 (23). Course of action promotes a goal . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . Argument from (positive) consequences
− Course of action is not related to an explicit goal . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Practical reasoning
26 (22). Conclusion is in favour of a course of action . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27.
− Conclusion is against a course of action . . . . . . 29.
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